Resale Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: An Economic Perspective by Larson, Alexander C.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 1
1996
Resale Issues in Telecommunications Regulation:
An Economic Perspective
Alexander C. Larson
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, and the
Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander C. Larson, Resale Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: An Economic Perspective, 2 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 57
(1996).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol2/iss1/2
RESALE ISSUES IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
Alexander C. Larson*
Cite As: Alexander C. Larson, Resale Issues In Telecommunications
Regulation: An Economic Perspective,
2 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 57 (1996)
available at <http://www.mttlr/voltwo/larson.pdf>
I. INTRODUCTION
Resale is the ability of a firm to purchase a service on a wholesale
basis, for the purpose of reselling that same service, either alone or in
combination with other services or features, to end users in direct com-
petition with the original service provider.' Resale .of local telephone
services as a telecommunications policy is currently among the most
important and contentious issues facing regulators, legislators, and the
industry
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Margret Starkey, and Terry Schroepfer for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
Chris Graves served as research assistant to the project. This Article has been adapted from
Alexander C. Larson, Optimal Resale Policies in Telecommunications Regulation
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1. The Federal Communications Commission has defined resale as "an activity
wherein one entity subscribes to the communications services and facilities of another entity
and then reoffers communications services and facilities to the public (with or without
'adding value') for profit." In re Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale and Shared Use of
Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), modifled 62 F.C.C.R. 2d
588 (1977), aff'd sub nor. AT&T Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
875 (1978) (involving private line resale); See also In re Regulatory Policies Concerning
Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switch Network Services, 83
F.C.C.R. 2d 167 (1980), aff'd sub nom. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
746 F.2d 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (involving switched network services resale).
2. Resale involves at least two distinct scenarios: (1) the resale or leasing of unbundled
network components and functions of the local exchange carriers (LECs); and (2)
"rebranding."
The resale of unbundled network components and functions is an arrangement in which
alternate local service providers are given the ability to purchase network functions per-
formed by an LEC as a wholesale service. This type of resale involves the leasing of LEC
facilities or service elements to enable other carriers to combine them with their own facili-
ties. The network functions involved could include, for example, the local loop, local
switching, dedicated transport, common transport, and SS7 call setup, as Ameritech pro-
posed in its "Customers First" plan. Petition for a Declaratory Ruling and Related Waivers to
Establish a New Regulatory Model for the Ameritech Region (filed Mar. 1, 1993), at 13. The
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The primary reason that regulatory agencies and legislators pursue
resale policies is to foster increased competition in telecommunications
markets where the current level of competition is considered inadequate
to serve the public interest. Unrestricted resale of the incumbent local
exchange carrier's (LEC's) local exchange services, or the network
functions and facilities that make the provision of resold local exchange
service possible, is viewed by policymakers and lawmakers as an es-
sential component of the transition to effective local exchange
competition. For example, it is an integral component of innovative
plans to foster local exchange competition, such as the Rochester "Open
Market" Plan,' and it figures prominently in the recently enacted Tele-
communications Act of 1996.' Unrestricted resale, it is argued, is
necessary to "jump-start" local exchange competition by allowing com-
petitors to enter the local exchange market expeditiously and on a
ubiquitous basis.
Similarly, it is argued that with a properly designed resale policy,
entry into local exchange markets could take place with minimal in-
vestment, and without the delay of entrants having to deploy their own
facilities or assume the risk associated with facilities-based entry into
these markets. Thus, with a properly designed resale policy, competitors
could quickly establish a customer base at minimal cost, and then begin
wholesale service could also include call detail and on-line access to all account-related
databases and operational support systems, including directory assistance and operator serv-
ices databases, so that customers can establish service with a reseller on the same basis as
with the LEC (i.e., service order and provisioning parity). The reseller would perform all
retail functions, such as marketing, sales, and customer billing. Generic unbundling issues
are discussed in Alexander C. Larson & Margarete Z. Starkey, Unbundling Issues and U.S.
Telecommunications Policy, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 83 (1994).
Rebranding is an arrangement in which the incumbent LEC makes available its local ex-
change telephone services at wholesale prices to other providers of telecommunications
services. This arrangement allows firms to offer local telephone services packaged with long
distance and other services. As such, they would be able to market themselves as full service
providers offering an alternative to the extant LEC's local telephone services. Rebranding
involves "one-stop shopping," where a carrier is simply packaging under its own brand name
its own long distance service and a LEC's local exchange service, without making any local
network investment. See Effect of Resale on Facilities-Based Competition in the Local Ex-
change Market (Teleport Communications Group)(Nov. 1995), at 1-2 (on file with the
author).
3. In re Rochester Telephone Corporation, Opinion and Order, Cases 93-C-0103 &
93-C-0033, Opinion No. 94-25, 160 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th (PUR) 554, 1994 WL 728535
(N.Y.P.S.C. 1994).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), at
§ 251.
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selective deployment of facilities in locations where they have sufficient
customers to justify the investment.5
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate proposed resale policies
from an economic perspective. Specifically, this Article evaluates
whether mandated resale can be expected to lead to the benefits ascribed
to it by its proponents. In addition, this Article identifies issues which
must be addressed before an economically sound local service resale
policy may be put into place.
II. LOCAL SERVICE RESALE IssuEs
A. Conditions Under Which Resale Is in the Public Interest
Resale as a policy is not automatically in the public interest, as leg-
islators and regulatory agencies often assume. It can only be an effective
policy if: (1) the competitive process in the retail market is impeded or
forestalled somehow (with a resulting detriment to consumers via high
prices, etc.) due to a lack of alternatives to the resold service; (2) direct
regulation of retail prices is incapable of remedying the situation; and
(3) industry cost conditions make resale conducive to welfare-
improving competition. All three of these conditions are violated when
applied to local exchange resale.
First, if alternatives to a resold service are generally available, re-
sale is not a necessary component of sound public policy because there
is no "problem" to correct in the first place. However, even assuming
that there are no alternatives available, it is not clear that the competi-
tive process in local exchange markets is impeded. One does not
observe entry into this market because prices are subsidized; thus, while
there are no alternative providers of local exchange service for residence
customers and many small business customers, they are not paying
overly high prices as a result. The reason that competition does not de-
velop is due to low subsidized prices, which means that most
prospective entrants to this market cannot expect to earn positive profits
post-entry. Further, even if resale policies increase the number of retail
suppliers, it does not necessarily follow that the competitive process in
that retail market has been enhanced.6
5. See, e.g., Comments to the FCC, In re Telephone Number Portability (CC Docket
No. 95-116) (filed by LDDS WorldCom on Sept. 12, 1995).
6. As an illustration, consider the analogous example of a market for bottled soft
drinks. Assume that producing the raw flavored syrup for the soft drink is the
"manufacturing" aspect of production, and that mixing the syrup with water, bottling it,
advertising it, and selling it is the "marketing" aspect of production. Assume that an antitrust
authority has deemed the competitive process in the retail market to be deficient, but that in
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Second, it is clear that the direct regulation of prices in local ex-
change markets is possible. In fact, the low prices that regulators set for
these services cannot be circumvented by the LECs and is probably the
very reason that entrants are not observed. If more renumerative and
hence more efficient prices were set by regulators, these would be the
prices in evidence in these markets.
Third, preliminary studies indicate that the costs avoided by LECs
by reselling instead of providing end-to-end service directly to end-
users are relatively small. This, combined with the extremely low price
elasticity of demand for local service, means that it is extremely doubt-
ful that resale policies can lead to significant changes in consumer
welfare. The "Catch-22" behind this characteristic of resale is discussed
in more detail in the next section.
In summary, a regulatory authority should only mandate resale of
local exchange services if resale will improve the economic perform-
ance of the retail market, and customers in the retail market will be
made better off as a result. From an economic perspective, it is ex-
tremely doubtful that this scenario will occur. Section II(B), infra,
discusses why resale is unlikely to lead to increases in economic effi-
ciency.
B. The Ability of Resale Policies to Result in
Increased Economic Efficiency
Local exchange service has an extremely low price elasticity of de-
mand.7 The lower the price elasticity of demand for local exchange
service, the greater the retail price decreases needed (as enabled by re-
sale) to produce significant increases in consumer benefits in the form
of increased consumer surplus.8 In other words, a large price reduction
is necessary just to produce a modest increase in the demand for local
service.
reality it is not. Given this, it improves neither the competitive process nor consumer surplus
in such a market if the regulatory authority forces the incumbent firm(s) to resell the bever-
age itself to bottler franchisees. The end result may appear to be an increase in the number of
vendors and may have the look and feel of "competition," but ultimately consumers are still
getting the same soft drink, at a retail price that is no lower. The same soft drink is offered to
consumers merely via a larger variety of bottled brands, and at additional cost to society to
do so.
7. This has been estimated at -.04 or less. See generally LESTER D. TAYLOR, TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS DEMAND IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).
8. Consumer surplus is an economic measure of consumer welfare defined as the dif-
ference in what a consumer is willing to pay for a given good, service, or commodity, minus
what he must pay. See e.g., DAvID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND
BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 49-50 (1995).
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Yet the very nature of resale makes these price decreases unlikely.
Resale allows new entrants to purchase the component of production of
local service that they cannot provide, and requires them to furnish only
the components of production (e.g., retail sales operations) that are
generally available to all firms. For this latter component of production,
no single firm is likely to have a significant cost advantage. However, if
resale is to bring the types of price reductions that can lead to significant
increases in economic efficiency (via increases in retail market
consumer surplus), it is this area in which entrants must have a
significant cost advantage over the LEC, since these are the only costs
resellers can control.
Somewhat of a "Catch-22" situation emerges-to yield significant
increases in consumer surplus, resale must enable competition that leads
to large decreases in local service prices; yet resale requires entrants to
provide (aside from the resold service) only that factor of production for
which no firm is likely to have a significant cost advantage. Further, the
costs avoided by the incumbent LEC, if it cedes the marketing function
to a reseller, are a relatively small component of the total cost of pro-
viding local exchange service. Thus, even if there were significant
innovations (and resulting cost reductions) in this component of pro-
duction, the probability of reducing the overall cost to society of local
exchange service significantly is remote. Given this, resale is unlikely to
result in a significant welfare improvement for consumers.
C. Optimal Pricing of Resold Services
When regulators decide to mandate resale, a significant dilemma
can arise: establishing the optimal wholesale price for the services that
are to be resold. Several largely anecdotal methods have been proposed
for calculating a wholesale price for local service resale. For example, a
"tops-down" approach has been proposed, in which the embedded costs
of the retail elements of "bundled" services would be estimated, and
would then be subtracted from the prevailing bundled price Alterna-
tively, a "bottoms-up" approach has been proposed, in which the LEC
would identify the incremental costs of all services or components of-
fered on a wholesale basis and add a fixed percentage of contribution to
each service/component to establish the wholesale price.
9. In re Application for Certification to Provide Facilities Based and Resold Exchange
Telecommunications Service in Those Portions of MSA-1 Served by Illinois Bell Telephone
Company d/b/a Ameritech Illinois and Central Telephone Company: Hearings on Docket
No. 95-0197 Before the Commerce Commission of the State of Illinois, at 34 (Jun. 21, 1995)
(prefiled direct testimony of AT&T Communications of Illinois, Inc. witness Lee L. Selwyn).
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Regarding such wholesale pricing, the overarching question for
regulators is: Which of the proposed wholesale pricing methods is opti-
mal, i.e., what wholesale/retail price differential will maximize
economic efficiency in the retail market? The issues surrounding deter-
mination of the optimal pricing method for resold services are not new;
they are in large part a variation of the problems addressed in the eco-
nomics literature on the pricing of access to so-called "essential
facilities."'
Economics dictates that the optimal price for wholesale services
purchased for resale is the current retail tariff rate, minus the avoided
incremental cost of retail marketing, plus the incremental cost of whole-
sale marketing to the LEC. Resellers should also pay a fixed charge
designed to recover the fixed and per-firm set-up costs of making resale
possible.12 This method of pricing the wholesale service is equivalent to
the well-known efficient component-pricing rule developed in the
regulation and economics literature for the pricing of intermediate pro-
ductive inputs. 3 The ECPR serves as an economic brightline defining
the point at which wholesale prices are "too high."
If local exchange markets were not the recipients of subsidies used
to foster universal service, this wholesale pricing rule could be imple-
mented directly. However, as Section 11(D), infra, discusses in more
detail, there are additional considerations when retail local exchange
markets are subsidized. The pricing' rule discussed above makes sense
only if existing LEC tariff rates are compensatory retail prices that
cover all relevant costs and provide an appropriate contribution to the
common costs of the LEC.
14
10. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TowARD COMPETITION IN Lo-
CAL TELEPHONY (1994) [hereinafter cited as BAUMOL & SIDAK, COMPETITIONI; William J.
Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
171 (1994)[hereinafter cited as Baumol & Sidak, Input Pricing]; and JEAN-JACQUES LAF-
FONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 255-
258 (1993). The efficient component-pricing rule is also known popularly as the Baumol-
Willig rule, the Baumol-Sidak rule, or the parity principle.
11. To make the discussion less complicated, this assumes that opportunity costs arising
from other cross-elastic effects are not present.
12. This optimal method of setting wholesale prices for resold services is very close to
what the Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires: "For the purposes of section 251(c)(4), a
State commission shall determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to sub-
scribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof
attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the
local exchange carrier." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996), at § 252(d)(3).
13. B.kUMOL & SIDAK, COMPETITION, supra note 10; Baumol & Sidak, Input Pricing,
supra note 10.
14. Common costs are shared costs which result from products or services being pro-
duced jointly, but in variable proportions. Common costs often are unattributable costs
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D. Resale and Subsidized Retail Markets
Local service rates have traditionally been held artificially low by
regulators to foster universal service. This was initially achieved
through residual pricing of local service, 5 with long distance and other
discretionary services priced relatively high to help support low local
service rates. In addition, local service rates were geographically aver-
aged over the entire service area to help keep prices low in high cost
areas. There are also many explicit funding mechanisms used to support
universal service objectives. 6 Regulatory policy has thus resulted in
rates for long distance services, discretionary services, and basic ex-
change service to businesses in metropolitan areas that are far above
cost in order to hold rates for basic residential service below cost. With
increased competition, many states adopted price ceilings or outright
price freezes on basic local service rates. Thus, the prices a LEC charges
today for local telephone service do not necessarily reflect market-based
retail prices, and hence cannot serve as the starting point in developing
wholesale prices.
Since retail prices in residential markets have been set at below-cost
levels to pursue universal service objectives, it begs the question of why
a regulatory agency would want to pursue resale in the first place. The
overarching economic reason for resale is to enhance or enable the
competitive process in the retail market, if the market failure in the re-
tail market is caused by the lack of availability of the service to be
resold (and if mandating resale can lead to increases in economic effi-
ciency). Resale makes sense as a policy only if prices in the retail
which are incurred in common for all the services supplied by the firm, and which do not
vary with the level of output. They are frequently understood to be only company-wide
overheads that cannot be attributed to any one service or group of services, though over-
heads are not the only type of common cost a firm may incur. As an example, consider
training for telephone operators, who may provide multiple services; their training is a com-
mon cost of the services they provide.
15. Residual ratemaking is the setting of the "residually priced" service rates so as to
yield closure to an authorized revenue requirement after the rates for all other services have
been determined. Thus, for a given service priced residually, its price is set so as to cover the
"residual" revenue requirement not recovered by all the other services whose prices have
already been determined. Residual pricing is typically used as a means of setting basic local
exchange rates at low levels to foster universal service.
16. These include the Universal Service Fund, Long Term Support, Yellow Pages im-
putation, Lifeline offerings in the various states, the Link-Up America program, and
Telecommunications Relay Services. For a more detailed description of the various sources
of universal service funding, see Alexander C. Larson, Pricing Principles in Telecommuni-
cations, in Telecommunications Law, Regulation and Policy (William H. Read & Walter
Sapronov eds., forthcoming 1996).
17. Alfred E. Kahn, A Free Ticket to Rich Telecom Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,
1995, at A15.
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market are too high (due to the possession of market power by the in-
cumbent firm), if the competition that would result from resale would
curb that market power, and if the direct regulation of retail prices is
considered an ineffective means of correcting this problem.
A market in which the retail price has been set at levels below cost
is not a market in which prices are too high due to market failure. If re-
tail prices have already been set at levels below cost, then the direct
regulation of downstream prices is a presumptively effective policy
tool, and the reason that competition from alternate suppliers does not
take place is that prices have been set so low in the first place, with
regulatory sanction. At the subsidized retail price, entry is unlikely to
occur anyway, and it is inappropriate to apply resale policies.
Entry into the subsidized residential and small business markets
would not occur on the basis of profits from these markets alone. Such
entry may be economically attractive only if it gives providers (the in-
cumbent LEC and resellers alike) the first opportunity to obtain the
business that is priced far above cost, such as vertical features and long
distance services. In a "one-stop shopping" telecommunications envi-
ronment, customers are likely to purchase most, if not all, of their
telecommunications services from the same provider to which they sub-
scribe for their basic local service. By requesting a discounted
wholesale rate in a market that is already subsidized, prospective re-
sellers are essentially demanding an equal opportunity at servicing the
overpriced markets-where they could undercut the LEC's artificially
inflated prices that help support below-cost local service-without
having to bear any of the costs that justify that overpricing. 8 A whole-
sale rate which is below the actual cost of service will ultimately require
the LEC's customers or stockholders to subsidize the reseller's custom-
ers. The remedy is obvious: prior to setting the wholesale price for
resold local exchange services, it would be in the public interest for
regulators to set the price of downstream retail services at an appropri-
ate level exceeding cost (taking carrier-of-last-resort responsibility and
related factors into consideration). Regulators could then observe that
market to see if government intervention is necessary to result in a more
efficient industry structure.
18. Id.
1995-1996] Resale Issues in Telecommunications Regulation
E. Resale and Antitrust Concerns
1. The Denial of Resale as an Anticompetitive Practice
It is sometimes argued that the failure of a LEC to offer services for
resale, at prices allowing the reseller to earn positive profits, is anticom-
petitive. However, whether the lack of availability of services for resale
is truly anticompetitive hinges on one question: is access to services via
resale an "essential facility" in the antitrust sense? If the answer to this
question is yes, then there may be a case for mandated resale policies.
However, qualitative economic analysis indicates the most likely an-
swer to this question is "no."
Resale proposals implicitly treat LEC local exchange services as de
facto "essential facilities," in the antitrust sense. That is, they assume
that for true competition to take place, a regulatory agency must man-
date open access to the LEC's local exchange services via resale.
However, in economic terms, whether a so-called "essential facility"
exists in a wholesale telecommunications market depends on its effect
on the competitive process in the adjacent retail markets. The
"essentiality" of resold services under the economic efficiency criterion
requires at least four necessary (though not sufficient) conditions to
hold true: (1) the absolute requirement that an entrant have physical ac-
cess to the "essential" resold service to provide service at all; (2) a
welfare-enhancing competitive process could not operate properly in the
retail market unless efficient entrants have access to the resold services;
(3) the "essential" resold service is available only from a monopolist or
consortium of firms acting as a monopolist, and no other source; and (4)
prospective entrants can earn positive profits post-entry when paying
the efficient wholesale price for resold services, as discussed above. In
economic terms, the essentiality of resold services requires the denial of
resale to result in a von Weizsdcker entry barrier to the downstream re-
tail market.' 9
19. Carl Christian von WeizsUcker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 399, 400 (1980) ("A barrier to entry is a cost of producing which must be borne by a
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry and
which implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social point of view."). Von
Weizsdcker's analysis indicated that under some simple assumptions (e.g., linear demand,
Cournot entry, scale economies in all firms' cost functions), the socially optimal number of
entrants can be smaller than the equilibrium number of entrants. The fact that entrants be-
yond the socially optimal number may be precluded from entry does not harm economic
efficiency. See Alexander C. Larson, William E. Kovacic & Douglas R. Mudd, Competitive
Access Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994)
(discussing the von Weizsacker entry barrier and its relation to the concept of essential fa-
cilities).
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Under the criterion of economic efficiency, the failure of a verti-
cally integrated firm to make services available via resale to firms
requiring them (as inputs to their retail service) is not a prima facie in-
dicator that such services, as productive inputs, are "essential." Further,
under the efficiency criterion, the fact that prospective entrants to the
retail market can increase their profits if resale policies occur is immate-
rial, since the existence of such entrants may or may not enhance
economic efficiency. Nor is it necessary to expect the vertically inte-
grated firm to increase its costs by engaging in resale just to make a
retail service offering possible by its downstream rivals in the retail
market.
At this point in the resale debate, it is clear that a lack of availability
of resold services is not anticompetitive, for several of the economic
conditions required for essentiality are violated in current telecommuni-
cations markets.
First, there is the absolute requirement that an entrant have physical
access to the "essential" resold service to provide service at all. Though
this may be true of some prospective entrants to the local exchange
markets, it is not true for all of them; some prospective entrants have the
ability to provide facilities-based service. As Areeda and Hovenkamp
have argued, a resource is not essential if competitors can operate ef-
fectively without it. For a resource to be essential, it must be not just
helpful, but vital to competitive survival.' It is important to note that in
economic terms and in the eyes of the courts, an alternative to a produc-
tive input (e.g., in the manner that facilities-based service is an
alternative to resold services) is not necessarily infeasible simply be-
cause it is more expensive.2' Perhaps more importantly, the fact that
access to a facility (e.g., via resale) is merely more economical than
other alternatives is not sufficient, in economic terms, to demonstrate
that a given facility is "essential;"' nor is the fact that with resale, a
competitor could achieve savings (and hence increased profits) at the
expense of the vertically integrated firm.
20. PHILLiP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAmp, ANTITRUST LAw 736.2 (1989 Supp.).
This constitutes broader criteria for essentiality than the economic criteria proposed above,
since the failure of competitors to survive may not impair a market's economic efficiency.
21. Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 717 F. Supp. 1528, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1989)
(ruling that a facility is not essential where "... . construction of [the upstream market's fuel]
storage tanks and pipelines is expensive. But, as both parties note, the [downstream South
Florida bunker fuel] market is burgeoning and potentially lucrative... The potential eco-
nomic gains to be reaped from an investment are substantial.").
22. Florida Cities v. Florida Power & Light, 525 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
23. City of Anaheim v. Southern California Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1373, 1381 (9th Cir.
1992).
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Second, there is the condition that a welfare-enhancing competitive
process could not operate properly in the retail market unless efficient
entrants have access to the resold services. This condition is wholly in-
applicable to local exchange markets, for they are subsidized markets. It
is not yet possible to know if efficient competition is foreclosed in local
exchange markets. This cannot be known until compensatory rates are
set for local service. Once this is done, it would then be possible to
observe the local exchange market and see if further government in-
tervention is needed to foster efficient competition. Until that time, it
is not possible to argue that competition is foreclosed in retail local
exchange markets. It simply doesn't exist yet because universal service
policies have required local service prices to be below cost, which
makes it less likely that entry will be observed in this market. Competi-
tion is not foreclosed due to a lack of resold services-it simply doesn't
exist yet in most markets because prospective entrants cannot earn
positive post-entry profits, due to the low prices that have been set to
meet universal service objectives.
Third is the condition that the "essential" resold service is available
only from a monopolist or consortium of firms acting as a monopolist,
and no other source. The fact that facilities-based competition is possi-
ble violates this condition.
Fourth, if resold services are truly essential, it must be true that pro-
spective entrants can earn positive post-entry profits when paying the
efficient wholesale price for resold services, as discussed in the previous
section. This condition is necessary to ensure that prospective entrants
are capable of engaging in welfare-increasing competition with the in-
cumbent firm if all other impediments to entry are relaxed. The proper
wholesale price is extremely important in determining if a given resale
policy (or the lack of one) is anticompetitive.
The efficient wholesale price of resold services discussed above is
an application of the efficient component-pricing rule (ECPR). Prospec-
tive entrants into local exchange markets may argue that overly "high"
wholesale prices for resold services are a de facto denial of resale. The
ECPR, however, serves as an economic brightline defiming the point at
which wholesale prices are "too high." It serves as a screen against inef-
ficient or opportunistic entrants seeking to gain entry to a market at
rates subsidized by the incumbent firm's stockholders. As Baumol and
Sidak have stated, "the [ECPR] offers the prospect of success to entrants
who can add efficiency to the supply of the final product, while it en-
sures that inefficient entrants are not made profitable by an implicit
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cross-subsidy extracted from the incumbent [firm]." If (but for the un-
availability of resold services) retail local exchange markets are not
competitive, then prospective entrants capable of fostering the competi-
tive process in those markets should be capable of paying the ECPR-
based wholesale rate; if not, then a welfare-improving competitive proc-
ess has not been foreclosed in the retail market, and neither a denial of
resale nor a wholesale price for resold services at the ECPR level (or
less) are anticompetitive. Prospective entrants that cannot pay an ECPR-
based wholesale price, and earn positive post-entry profits, are irrele-
vant to the competitive process. It is not anticompetitive if the lack of a
resale policy prevents the entry of such firms; nor is it anticompetitive if
such prospective entrants fail to earn positive post-entry profits at the
ECPR-based wholesale price.
One way in which resale policies would, in fact, be anticompetitive
is if the wholesale price of resold service is based on an arbitrary fixed
percentage of the incumbent firm's retail price. This would needlessly
eliminate the incumbent itself as a potentially efficient competitor. If
the wholesale price is tied to the incumbent LEC's retail price, the in-
cumbent LEC can never compete on the merits of its retail pricing; each
time it lowers its retail price, its competitors' input prices also are low-
ered. Each time the incumbent firm attempts to compete on price, it
faces competitors whose input prices have decreased by a proportion of
its own retail price decrease. If the wholesale price is tied to the incum-
bent's retail price, the incumbent firm will eventually be forced to exit
the retail market (if legally allowed to do so), and become only a whole-
saler, ceding the sale of the retail service to its competitors. If the
incumbent LEC cannot exit the market (due to carrier-of-last-resort re-
sponsibility or other legal reasons), it will needlessly run deficits, and its
stockholders would be subsidizing the entry of resellers.
2. Resale Policies Compared with Exclusive
Franchises as an Antitrust Concern
Antitrust analysis has produced an analog to resale policies: the
analysis of exclusive franchises and the conditions under which they
may raise antitrust concerns. The issue in telecommunications is
whether it is in the public interest (i.e., whether it increases economic
efficiency or mitigates potential antitrust concerns) to mandate inte-
grated LECs to resell services to firms who would be the LECs'
downstream competitors; the analogous issue of exclusive franchises is
whether there are legitimate antitrust concerns if a manufacturer inte-
24. Baumol & Sidak, Input Pricing, supra note 10, at 185.
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grates forward into the marketing component of production vis-i-vis
that same manufacturer selling its output to competitive dealers. In
comparing the case of full integration of the manufacturing and mar-
keting functions versus manufacturing by one firm, and distribution by
competitive dealers, Fisher's analysis concludes that the nature of costs
in the marketing component of production (the component avoided by
the LEC when reselling) determines whether the integrated firm has in-
terests that coincide with those of the public interest.'
More specifically, Fisher concluded that if there are constant returns
to scale in the marketing component of production, "then the fully inte-
grated case and the competitive dealers case both yield the same
outputs, the same retail prices, and the same profits to the manufac-
turer."26 If, however, there are decreasing returns to scale in marketing,
the competitive dealers case yields lower profits to the manufacturer
and results in a lower output and a higher retail price than does the fully
integrated case.27 Thus, Fisher concluded that in choosing between the
fully integrated case and the case of competitive dealers, the interests of
the incumbent manufacturer coincide with those of society.2 The rele-
vance of this conclusion to resale policies in telecommunications is that,
within the assumptions of the Fisher model, there is no compelling rea-
son to mandate resale policies.
Fisher's analysis also compares the case of competitive dealers with
that of a single monopoly dealer, and concludes that the competitive
case always results in a greater output and a lower retail price than does
the case of a monopoly dealer.29 A failure to distinguish properly be-
tween the integrated supplier case and the monopoly dealer case may be
the root of confusion about the benefits of resale policies. The case of
the telecommunications industry is not that of a monopoly dealer versus
competitive dealers-it is a case of an integrated supplier (i.e., one that
defacto has integrated forward from the manufacturing function into the
marketing function) versus manufacture by one firm (with distribution
and marketing handled by competitive dealers). In the latter situation
(but not the former), the interests of a monopoly manufacturer coincide
with those of society.
25. FRANKLIN M. FISHER, Can Exclusive Franchises Be Bad?, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANI-
ZATION, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS OF FRANKLIN M. FISHER 154
(1991).
26. Id. at 160-61.
27. Id. at 161.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 163.
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F. Resale Policies Can Retard the Development of
Efficient Facilities-Based Competition
In general, facilities-based competition is likely to be more efficient
than competition that is based solely on resale policies. Though resale
may spur innovation in the marketing of local exchange services, it will
not do so for the production of the local exchange services themselves,
as facilities-based competition will. As this Article has already pointed
out, the costs to market local exchange services are relatively small in
comparison with the corresponding costs to produce it. Resale provides
incentives to lower a very small component of the costs of local ex-
change service, but unlike facilities-based competition, it does not
provide incentives to engage in cost-reducing innovation where the re-
ductions in costs are likely to be greatest: in the production of the
service itself.
A poorly designed resale policy can lead to inefficient incentives for
both prospective entrants and incumbent LECs, and in so doing, retard
the growth of efficient facilities-based competition. In this regard, two
problems with resale immediately unfold.
First, any prospective entrant knows that if there are network com-
ponents it needs, it can attempt to gain access to them via resale policies
in lieu of engaging in its own investment. Entrants thus have reduced
incentives to develop vertically integrated production processes leading
to the completion of a final product for sale to end users. A poorly de-
signed resale policy will give entrants the incentive to engage only in
the stages of production in which they can excel, but not the incentive to
innovate and develop all stages of production required for completion of
the final product.
Second, LEC competitors may seek to gain access to valuable net-
work components at resale prices that do not reflect the true social costs
of the access. Such entrants may be able to enter the market only if they
are allowed access to these network components at advantageous resale
rates and terms (in lieu of engaging in their own investment). Unfortu-
nately, this is not what true competition is about, for entry that occurs in
this way does little or nothing to yield the benefits to consumers of fa-
cilities-based competition.
A regulatory authority may pursue a mandated resale policy because
it believes that by doing so, it can simulate the results of a so-called
"contestable" market downstream by removing what it considers
"barriers to entry" to the downstream retail market (i.e., by removing
sunk costs of producing the retail service). Thus, the intent of creating a
"wholesale" local exchange service through resale policies may be to
reduce the initial start-up costs of entering the local exchange market,
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and to circumvent the large investments and associated risk required to
build competing local distribution networks. If competition is based on
resale policies in lieu of facilities-based competition, LECs would as-
sume all the expense and risk of putting plant into the ground and of
maintaining and upgrading it, while resellers could use this plant at a
low price and walk away from it without losses if adequate consumer
demand did not develop. Facilities-based competition for local ex-
change telecommunications services is far more likely to bring about
the benefits of competition compared to "competition" based on resale.
The prospect of competition has resulted in research, development,
mergers, joint ventures, partnerships, and the trialing of innovative new
technologies and new applications by diverse (and often non-traditional)
companies, all in efforts to become viable and successful competitors in
the emerging competitive telecommunications environment.
Thus, resale may seriously reduce incentives for LECs and other
firms to engage in cost-reducing innovation or network modernization
in the future, since the LECs must expect that they may be required to
make components of their innovations available to competitors on terms
that may not allow recovery of the investment. This type of
"competition" cannot bring about real economic efficiencies and the
type of competition that lowers total industry costs. Because resale can-
not spur true local exchange competition (in the economist's sense),
"competition" from resellers will have no effect on the incumbent
LEC's incentive to increase quality or lower production costs. Since the
non-facilities based reseller must pirchase its primary productive input
from the existing LEC, any quality improvement by the LEC will also
be granted to the reseller. No competitive advantage would be granted
to the LEC by improving the quality of its service. Similarly, the exist-
ing LEC will have no increased incentive to lower the cost of its service.
Any cost savings achieved by the LEC would also be granted to the
non-facilities based competitor through lower wholesale rates. The in-
cumbent carrier would not realize any competitive advantage from
lowering its costs.
Thus, resale provides misguided incentives to both incumbent LECs
and to prospective entrants: it rewards innovative marketing (a small
component of the total cost of local service), but unlike facilities-based
competition, it offers prospective entrants no incentive to engage in
cost-reducing innovation.
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III. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the benefits ascribed to mandated resale of
local exchange services are unlikely to materialize, and poorly crafted
resale policies may well have the opposite effect: retarding rather than
fostering efficient facilities-based entry, and hence withholding from
consumers the benefits of the efficiency of competitive local exchange
service markets.
This Article arrives at the following conclusions:
(1) Resale as a policy is not automatically in the public interest, as
legislators and regulatory agencies often assume. It can only be an
effective policy if: (a) the competitive process in the retail market is
impeded or forestalled somehow (with a resulting detriment to
consumers via high prices, etc.) due to a lack of alternatives to the
resold service; (b) direct regulation of retail prices is incapable of
remedying the situation; and (c) industry cost conditions make resale
conducive to welfare-improving competition.
(2) Resale is unlikely to result in a significant welfare improve-
ment for consumers. For resale to yield significant increases in
consumer surplus, it must enable competition that leads to large de-
creases in local service prices. Yet resale requires entrants to provide
(aside from the resold service) only that factor of production for which
no firm is likely to have a significant cost advantage. Further, if the
costs avoided by the incumbent LEC (in ceding the marketing function
to a reseller) are a very small component of the total cost of providing
local exchange service, then even significant innovations (and resulting
cost reductions) in this component of production has a low probability
of reducing the overall cost to society of local exchange service signifi-
cantly.
(3) The optimal price for wholesale services purchased for resale
is the current retail tariff rate, minus the avoided incremental cost of
retail marketing, plus the incremental cost of wholesale marketing to the
LEC. Resellers should also pay a fixed charge designed to recover the
fixed and per-firm set-up costs of making resale possible. This method
of pricing the wholesale service is equivalent to the well-known effi-
cient component-pricing rule developed in the regulation and economics
literature for the pricing of intermediate productive inputs.
(4) Resale in subsidized markets is inappropriate. A market in
which the retail price has been set at levels below cost is not a market in
which prices are too high due to market failure, and hence which may
require a resale policy.
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(5) The failure of a vertically integrated firm to make services
available via resale to firms requiring them (as inputs to their retail
service) is not a prima facie indicator that such services, as productive
inputs, are "essential facilities." Further, the fact that prospective en-
trants to the retail market can increase their profits if resale policies
occur is immaterial, since the existence of such entrants may or may not
enhance economic efficiency.
(6) Facilities-based local exchange competition is more likely to
lead to efficient retail pricing than the competition spawned by resale
policies. A poorly designed resale policy can lead to inefficient incen-
tives for both prospective entrants and incumbent LECs, and in so
doing, retard the growth of efficient facilities-based competition.
